Abstract-Pricing and task allocation are vital to improving the efficiency in mobile crowdsensing, an emerging human-in-theloop application paradigm. Previous studies focused on incentive mechanism design for specific sensing applications where one party (either task initiators or platform) can dominate the pricing and task allocation process. These results, however, are not applicable to a free crowdsensing market where multiple task initiators and task participants (mobile users), as peers, are engaged to maximize their own interests. New incentive mechanisms are pressingly needed to produce a solution, so that the interests of all participating parties can be considered. In this paper, appealing to exchange economy theory, we employ the notion of "Walrasian Equilibrium" as a comprehensive metric, at which there exists a price vector for mobile users and an allocation for task initiators such that the allocation is Pareto optimal and the market gets cleared (i.e., all sensing tasks are performed). We consider a standard model where the utility function for sensing quality is monotonically increasing, differentiable, and concave, and the payoff function for a mobile user is linear. To address the problem, we first characterize the supply-demand pattern for a given price vector, which is the subset of mobile users selected by each task initiator to perform the task. We then devise methods for validating the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium within each supply-demand pattern. One key step is to divide the space of prices into a collection of appropriate cells, based on the hyperplane arrangement, so that each cell has a unique supply-demand pattern. We devise an algorithm that can find a Walrasian Equilibrium in polynomial time, for a case of practical interest where the classes of mobile devices are bounded. Based on the insight, we further consider the general case and design an efficient pattern search (EPS) algorithm to reduce the search space, thus accelerating the search process accordingly. This is realized by choosing the supply-demand pattern which is closer to the "Walrasian Equilibrium" than the pattern in previous iteration in the search process. Our results show that EPS can find an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium in polynomial time for the general case, given a constant .
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE past few years have witnessed the dramatic proliferation of portable mobile devices (e.g., smartphones). Equipped with a set of sensors (e.g., camera, light sensor and GPS), these mobile devices can provide a high volume of sensory data of diverse properties, thus offering great opportunities to carry out mobile crowdsensing. Thanks to its potential to enable large-scale sensing applications with a lower cost, mobile crowdsensing has recently attracted great attention, becoming one emerging human-in-the-loop paradigm. Indeed, it has found applications in a variety of fields, ranging from environmental monitoring to social pattern recognition, to individual entertainment [1] - [3] .
In mobile crowdsensing, a platform is often used to enable cost-effective large-scale sensing applications [4] , [5] . A unified framework for mobile crowdsensing is illustrated in Fig. 1 . On one side, sensing tasks arrive from different task initiators, requesting for certain information at specific times and locations. On the other side, mobile users, who are present at the specific locations, accept and carry out these sensing tasks. The platform functions as an interface to connect a set of sensing tasks to the suitable mobile users, so as to accomplish efficient mobile crowdsensing.
It is challenging to ensure the high quality of the sensing data submitted by mobile users in mobile crowdsensing. In conventional sensor networks, the sensing quality could be maintained by judiciously determining the number of dedicated sensors to be deployed and their sensing time. In contrast, in mobile crowdsensing, since mobile users are not dedicated, they may not fulfill the sensing tasks if it were not for their own interest in order to lower the expense (i.e., power and bandwidth consumption), resulting in sensing data with poor quality. Further, since sensing data often contain user's private information (e.g., location information), mobile users, concerned about the privacy leakage, may not participate in the crowdsensing. In a nutshell, it is challenging to guarantee desired quality of sensing for sensing tasks.
Clearly, incentive mechanism design is of great importance to motivate the participation of mobile users in mobile 0733-8716 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. crowdsensing [6] - [9] . Most previous studies focused on designing incentive mechanisms from the interest of task initiators or the platform for specific sensing applications. In such a way, it can be guaranteed that mobile users will behave truthfully and task initiators (platform) can maximize their (its) utility. However, their results do not work for a crowdsensing platform where multiple task initiators and mobile users are engaged to maximize their own interest. Observe that there are three parties involved in mobile crowdsensing: 1) mobile users, 2) task initiators, and 3) platform. Obviously, no one can dominate the crowdsensing process in the unified crowdsensing platform. In devising a good incentive scheme, one has to specify "what does the good mean," which would vary one party to another: 1) mobile users aim to maximize the profit of performing sensing tasks, 2) task initiators strive to maximize the quality of sensing of their sensing tasks, and 3) the platform would desire social welfare maximization. New incentive mechanisms are pressingly needed to produce a comprehensive solution, so that the interest of all participating parties can be taken into account. In this paper, we consider a standard mobile crowdsensing model where the utility function for quality of sensing is monotonically increasing, differentiable and concave, and the payoff function for a mobile user is linear. We focus on devising an incentive scheme that would benefit all three parties, in a balanced manner. Appealing to recent advances in Exchange Economy theory, the notion of "Walrasian Equilibrium" can serve for this purpose well, in the sense that at a Walrasian Equilibrium there exists a price vector and an allocation, at which the following three missions are accomplished simultaneously: 1) the market clears, 2) both mobile users and task initiators maximize the payoffs (under certain constraints), and 3) the overall system reaches a Pareto optimal operating point. In short, a Walrasian Equilibrium quantifies a state beneficial to all participating parties, and this is one salient feature going beyond the well-known notion of Nash Equilibrium.
Despite its attractiveness, computing a Walrasian Equilibrium for general market is PPAD complete 1 and also "hard" 1 Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs (PPAD) is a complexity class that is frequently adopted in the area of algorithmic game theory. A PPAD problem is believed to be hard.
to approximate [10] . There are polynomial time algorithms to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium for some basic scenarios (e.g., a market with linear payoff functions). Further, in the above formulation for crowdsensing, the payoff function of each task initiator depends on the utility of the sensing task and the price paid to mobile users, which is convex but not monotonically increasing (see Eq. (2)). We emphasize that these unique characteristics make it more challenging to satisfy the condition of market clearance and thus to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium [11] . We explore the problem structure of mobile crowdsensing to derive the unique supply-demand patterns. By doing this, we simplify the supply-demand relationship between mobile users and task initiators, and design polynomial-time algorithms to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium based on [10] , [12] .
Our contributions are three-fold:
• We formulate the problem of finding a Walrasian Equilibrium to provide a desirable solution for all three parties involved in mobile crowdsourcing. By exploiting the characteristic of utility functions (monotonically increasing, differentiable and concave) for sensing quality, we characterize the supply-demand pattern for a fixed price vector, i.e., the subset of mobile users that each task initiator would choose to perform the task. The structure revealed by the supply-demand patterns is then employed to find a Walrasian Equilibrium.
• We then devise schemes to validate the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium within each supply-demand pattern. Based on the hyperplane arrangement, the price space is divided into a collection of cells such that there is a unique supply-demand pattern in each cell. Our findings show that, the proposed algorithm can find a Walrasian Equilibrium within polynomial time for an interesting case where the classes of mobile devices (not the number of mobile users) are bounded.
• As the computational complexity of calculating all the supply-demand patterns is in general exponential, we further design an efficient pattern search (EPS) algorithm to reduce the search space. In EPS, the next supply-demand pattern is judiciously chosen to reduce the difference of overall supply and demand (DoSD) (see the detailed definition in Sec. V), thus increasing the convergence rate. We show that, given a constant , EPS can find an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium within polynomial time. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present in Sec. II the system model and the problem formulation. We characterize the supply-demand patterns and give a solution for the homogeneous case in Sec. III. We devise polynomial-time algorithms to find a Walrasian Equilibrium for an interesting case in Sec. IV and an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium for the general case in Sec. V. We discuss the related work in Sec. VII, and conclude the paper in Sec. VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a mobile crowdsensing platform consisting of a set of mobile users U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n }, and a set of sensing 
where n and m are the number of mobile users and sensing tasks, respectively. Each mobile user has a portable device, which is equipped with a set of sensors. Each sensing task v j ∈ V , associated with a task initiator, is given a budget b j , which represents the "monetary" incentive provided by v j to encourage the participation of mobile users. We will use sensing task and task initiator interchangeably hereafter when there is no ambiguity. Notations frequently used in this work are summarized in Table I .
The operation of the mobile crowdsensing system is divided into slots. In each slot, each mobile user has a limited available time t i to perform sensing tasks. When mobile users and sensing tasks enter the mobile crowdsensing system, their basic information (e.g., ID, b j and t i ) will be registered so that they will be processed in next slot. Each slot is comprised of an initialization phase and task performing phase. In the initialization phase, the crowdsensing system performs pricing and task allocation with the available information about mobile users and task initiators collected in the last slot. Then in the task performing phase, mobile users work on the allocated tasks and return the sensing reports at the end of the slot. Therefore, we will only focus on the pricing and task allocation in each slot hereafter.
Mobile users and task initiators aim to maximize their payoffs (which will be defined later) in the trading process, which takes place in two steps: i) first, each mobile user u i determines the price p i of a unit amount of his sensing time, and ii) then, each task initiator v j chooses x i j amount of sensing time to buy from mobile user u i . Notice that each mobile user u i ∈ U sets the same price p i for all sensing tasks. This is because the platform acts as a free exchange market and the price of a commodity (i.e., sensing time of a mobile user) should be same to all buyers (task initiators). Let x i = (x i j ) v j ∈V denote the vector of sensing time that mobile user u i spends for all tasks, x j = (x i j ) u i ∈U denote the vector of sensing time that task v j purchases from all mobile users, and x = (x i j ) u i ∈U,v j ∈V denote an allocation scheme.
Each task v j has a utility function φ j (·) to quantify its quality of sensing. In general, φ j (·) depends on many factors according to application scenarios. In this work, we adopt the most popular model, assuming that the utility function φ j (t) is a monotonically increasing, differentiable and concave function of the sensing time t. Intuitively, the more sensing time is contributed, the higher quality of sensing is. Also, it captures the famous law of diminishing return, which is widely used to characterize utility functions [13] . It follows that,
That is to say that the demand from task initiator v j would be extremely high when the prices of sensing service approach zero, and the demand would be zero when the prices of sensing service approach infinity. Therefore, this assumption confirms to the intuition of practical exchange market. Due to their heterogeneity, mobile devices of different classes (e.g., iPads and smartphones) may make different contributions to the quality of sensing for a given amount of sensing time. To capture this, we use weight w i j to indicate the contribution of unit sensing time to the quality of sensing of task v j that mobile user u i makes. w i j = w i j if u i and u i are of the same class. Due to the fact that sensing time from different mobile users can contribute to the quality of sensing for the same task, we assume that sensing time that different mobile users expend for the same task are addible. Thereby, for a given x j , the total weighted time for task v j is
Each agent (i.e., either mobile user or task initiator) is associated with a payoff function, which represents his net gain. For mobile user u i , the payoff function is given by
i.e., the incentive that mobile user u i can obtain by selling sensing service. The payoff function of each task initiator v j consists of two components: 1) the utility gained from the sensing data, and 2) the incentives paid for the sensing service from mobile users, i.e.,
Note that we focus on the pricing and task allocation in a unified crowdsensing platform, which is quite promising due to the rapid advance in crowdsensing. 2 In practice, many single-task sensing applications (air quality monitoring, traffic monitoring, etc.) can be captured by our mathematical model, and thus included in the platform. For example, it is popular for many location based services to provide extensive snapshots of a geographic region (e.g., Google Map) so that people can know well about a place without being there physically. In such a scenario, it would be costly for the service provider to travel around and spend an hour or even longer at each spot to take pictures from any possible angle, in order to guarantee the sensing quality. Instead, they could crowdsource these sensing tasks to mobile users near candidate spots with incentives. Clearly, the number of different pictures that mobile users can take depend on their stay time. Moreover, the types of mobile devices determine the resolution of the pictures being taken and thus the sensing quality. A picture with higher resolution results in higher utility as the users of the location based service can have a clearer understanding about the surroundings of the specific spot. Thereby, we could model the sensing contribution of each mobile user by a summation of weighted sensing time. Further, the total utility follows the law of diminishing return since the marginal utility decreases due to image redundancy as the total number of pictures taken from the same spot increases.
In a mobile crowdsensing platform, task initiators and mobile users bargain about the prices p and the allocation x, in order to maximize their own payoffs. Specifically, the objectives for task initiator v j and mobile user u i to optimize are
Mobile user u i :
In addition, the platform aims to maximize the social welfare
Since each agent has his own objective, it is desirable to find a price vector p * and an allocation x * such that all would benefit from crowdsensing. To this end, we adopt the notion of Walrasian Equilibrium in Exchange Economy Theory, and find such an optimal scheme. Formally, we define a Walrasian Equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1: A Walrasian Equilibrium for the crowdsensing system is a pair of price vector p * and allocation x * such that, given p * , 1) for any task initiator v j , x * j is the optimal solution to problem (3), 2) for any mobile user u i , x * i is the optimal solution to problem (4), and 3) the market clears, i.e., v j ∈V x * i j = t i , for all u i ∈ U. Note that in problem (4), the optimal solution can be any allocation x i satisfying v j ∈V x i j = t i , which coincides with the condition of market clearance. Therefore, it suffices for a Walrasian Equilibrium ( p * , x * ) to satisfy conditions (1) and (3) in our problem.
Due to the stringent requirement of market clearance and the budget constraints of task initiators, the above problem cannot be solved by the approach in [15] , where solving social welfare maximization problem leads to a Walrasian Equilibrium. Moreover, our problem is different from the existing works on Walrasian Equilibrium in two aspects: i) the payoff function ϕ j (x j , p) is not a monotonically increasing function of x j , and ii) the payoff function of each task initiator depends on the price vector p. These unique characteristics make it challenging to satisfy the condition of market clearance, and thus to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium.
III. FROM SUPPLY-DEMAND PATTERN
TO WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM Given a price vector p, each task initiator can maximize his own payoff by judiciously selecting a subset of mobile users for sensing service. Such a selection of mobile users is called supply-demand pattern. In this section, we first explore the problem structure to characterize the supply-demand pattern between task initiators and mobile users. We then illustrate, for the homogeneous case, how to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium by utilizing the supply-demand pattern.
A. Characterizing supply-demand Pattern
Given a fixed price vector p, the sensing services of mobile users demanded by task initiators can be found by maximizing Eq. (3). The key to obtaining a Walrasian Equilibrium is to determine the supply-demand pattern, given a price vector. Such supply-demand patterns are crucial to understand the problem dimension and decide the optimal prices p of mobile users.
We focus on solving problem (3) for a fixed price vector p. Define λ i j and y i j as follows:
The problem (3) can be rewritten
.e., the set of mobile users who achieve the minimum value of λ i j for task v j (for the given p). Let i ( j ) be any mobile user in U j, p . The supplydemand pattern can be characterized as stated in the following theorem. Theorem 1: Given a price vector p, task initiator v j can maximize his own payoff by purchasing sensing services from mobile users in U j, p only.
Proof:
is an optimal solution to problem (6) . We first consider the case when |U j, p | = 1. From y * j , we can construct a new allocation y j for task v j as follows:
Then y j is a feasible solution to problem (6) , since the following holds:
Further, note that it must be true that y * i j = 0, for all i = i ( j ). Otherwise, we have ϕ j ( y j ) − ϕ j ( y * j ) > 0, which contradicts with the fact that y * j is the optimal solution. This means that task initiator v j can maximize its own payoff by buying sensing time only from i ( j ).
When |U j, p | > 1, similarly we can show that task initiator v j can maximize its own payoff by buying sensing time from mobile users in U j, p only.
In Theorem 1, each task initiator v j will choose mobile users who have the minimum cost λ i j in a supply-demand pattern. Such a finding greatly simplifies the problem. Further, we can calculate the amount of sensing time that v j will buy from mobile users in U j, p . We reduce the problem (6) to the following:
By solving the problem (7), we obtain the optimal solution as
where
amount of sensing time) from either a single mobile user i ( j ) or any combination y i j ( p) from mobile users u i ∈ U j, p , satisfying
Denote by V i, p the set of task initiators who select mobile user u i for the sensing service. Given p and an allocation x( p), we denote by d i ( p, x) the demand on the sensing service of mobile user
between the supply and demand of the sensing service of u i . Notice that d j ( p) is the total demand of v j in terms of y i j , which can be regarded as the weighted sensing time, while d i ( p, x) is the demand on user u i in terms of sensing time
, the set of mobile users that are selected by task initiators in V . When p is clear in the context, we will drop p and x, and simply use
B. Finding A Walrasian Equilibrium: Homogeneous Case
As an illustrative example, we describe how to find a Walrasian Equilibrium for the homogeneous case, i.e., when mobile devices are of the same class. In this case, we have
Recall the result obtained in Sec. III-A, i.e., given the price vector p, task initiator v j will purchase sensing service from mobile users in U j, p only. We have the following necessary condition for the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium.
Lemma 1: For the homogeneous case, we have that 
Similarly, for mobile user
We proceed to find a Walrasian Equilibrium. As all mobile users would decide the same price at a Walrasian Equilibrium, we will use the price p to denote the price of any mobile user for the rest of this subsection. Clearly,
Recall that each task can choose sensing service from any combination of mobile users. From this and Lemma 1, we can regard all mobile users as a single mobile user with a large time budget of This leads to the following Theorem.
Theorem 2: There is a unique Walrasian Equilibrium for the homogeneous case, which can be obtained by calculating the solution to the equation
Remarks: At a Walrasian Equilibrium for the homogeneous case, all mobile users have the same price. Hence, we could regard all mobile users as a singe mobile user. Similarly, we can also regard all task initiators as a single task initiator. There is only one supply-demand pattern (as there are only one mobile user and one task initiator), under which a Walrasian Equilibrium exists.
IV. FINDING AN EXACT WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM
Next, we study the general case, where w i j may vary depending on different mobile user u i ∈ U and task initiator v j ∈ V . We design a scheme to find an exact Walrasian Equilibrium based on hyperplane arrangement [16] . 
A. Finding All supply-demand Patterns
In this subsection, we describe how to find all supplydemand patterns by dividing the space R n + of n-dimensional price vector into cells, in which there is a unique supplydemand pattern.
Note that, for task initiator v j who chooses mobile user
The supply-demand pattern may change as the price vector p varies. In order to determine the set U j, p for each task initiator v j , we define a set of functions as
Considering all task initiators, we have 
Therefore, each task initiator v j can determine the set U j, p , which indicates that there is a unique supply-demand pattern in each cell. Since there are n(n − 1)m hyperplanes in space R n + , the number of cells is at most (n(n − 1)m) n [16] . Thus, the lemma follows.
Lemma 2: There are at most O (n 2 m) n supply-demand patterns.
An illustrative example is provided in Fig. 2 , where there are n = 2 mobile users and m = 3 task initiators. Suppose that the weights, {w i j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, 3}, are given by the following matrix:
Then each task initiator v j , j = 1, 2, 3, can select a mobile user by one of three lines (hyperplanes) ρ 1,2, j = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, which create 7 cells. Within each cell, the signs of ρ 1,2, j can be easily decided. For example, in cell 3, ρ 1,2,1 > 0, ρ 1,2,2 < 0 and ρ 1,2,3 < 0. Therefore, in this supply-demand pattern, task initiator 1 will choose mobile user 2, and task initiators 2 and 3 will choose mobile user 1.
We note that each cell may not have a unique supplydemand pattern, and therefore different cells may have the same pattern.
B. Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium for Each Pattern
From Lemma 2, in order to find a Walrasian Equilibrium, it suffices to check if there is a Walrasian Equilibrium in each cell. We now focus on a cell k, and determines if there exists a Walasian Equilibrium in cell k. We denote by C k the feasible region of p in cell k. First, we calculate the total demand of each task initiator v j , i.e.,
We then check the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium by considering the following two cases. Case 1: Every task initiator v j chooses only one mobile user u i( j ) for his task, i.e., |U j, p | = 1. In this case, we first calculate the total sensing service of each mobile user u i demanded by all task initiators, i.e.,
Then, for each mobile user u i , find a solution p * i to the following equation:
Case 2: At least one task initiator selects more than one mobile users for his task, i.e., |U j, p | > 1 for some v j ∈ V . Denote by U 0 the set of mobile users who are selected by only one task initiator. Let V be the set of task initiators who choose mobile users only from U 0 , and U be the set of mobile users who are selected by task initiators in V . Let U = U \ U and V = V \ V . For each v j ∈ V , we first focus on the following equation:
It is easy to find p i( j ) to satisfy the above equation. Also, for any two mobile users u i and u i in U j, p ∩ U , p i /w i j = p i /w i j . Therefore, we can obtain the price p i for any mobile user u i ∈ U . Next, we construct a bipartite graph G(U , V , E), where there is an edge e i j ∈ E between u i ∈ U and v j ∈ V if u i ∈ U j, p ∩ U . Without loss of generality, we assume G(U , V , E) is connected. 3 Similarly, we can show that, for any two mobile users u i and u i in ( p i 0 ) , where u i 0 is a mobile user in U . Then, given each mobile user u i ∈ U , we associate a coefficient α i j ≥ 0 with edge e i j ∈ E such that j α i j = 1.
For each task v j ∈ V , we can construct the following equation: Since in Eq. (8), the term on the left-hand side is a linear function of α and the term on the right-hand side is a decreasing continuous function, it is easy to check the existence of the root of the equations for all tasks v j ∈ V . If such α exists and p ∈ C k , we find a Walrasian Equilibrium at current cell; otherwise, we continue to check the next cell.
Through this procedure, we can determine the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium in each cell. We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: A Walrasian Equilibrium can be found with time complexity of O((n 2 m) n ) by the hyperplane arrangement based approach in the general case.
An illustrative example is provided in Fig. 3 , where there are 6 mobile users and 5 task initiators. The supply-demand pattern is given in Fig. 3(1) . We have V = {v 5 } and U = {u 4 
Note that each demand d j only depends on p 1 since p i = κ i1 p 1 . If we can find such α and { p i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} to the above equations satisfying p ∈ C k and α 11 +α 12 = α 23 +α 24 = α 32 + α 33 = 1, then we have a Walrasian Equilibrium.
Remarks: In reality, the total number of classes of mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and Google Nexus) is limited, though the number of mobile users can be arbitrarily large. Let n be the number of classes of mobile devices. By treating the mobile users of the same class as a single mobile user with a large capacity (the same as in Sec. III-B), it is easy to show that the time complexity of computing a Walrasian Equilibrium is O((n 2 m) n ), which is polynomial when n is bounded.
V. POLYNOMIAL-TIME APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we focus on finding an approximation Walrasian Equilibrium within polynomial time for the general case. There are several definitions of an approximation Walrasian Equilibrium. We adopt the following one in this paper.
Definition 2: A tuple ( p * , x * ) is an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium if: 1) |t i − v j ∈V x i j | ≤ , ∀ u i ∈ U, and 2) given p * , x * j maximizes the payoff of task initiator v j ,
Given ( p, x), recall that δ i ( p, x) = t i − v j ∈V x i j denote the difference between supply and demand of sensing service of mobile user u i . We also define the difference of overall supply and demand (DoSD) as follows.
Definition 3 (DoSD): Given a price vector and an allocation ( p, x), the associated value δ( p) of DoSD is given by δ( p, x) ≤ , ( p, x) is an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium.
According to the Definition 2, when
In previous section, we searched a Walrasian Equilibrium exhaustively among all possible supply-demand patterns. There are two approaches that can be employed to enhance the search efficiency. First, we can remove some patterns in which a Walrasian Equilibrium obviously does not exist. For example, if one mobile user is not selected by any task initiator in a supply-demand pattern, a Walrasian Equilibrium does not exist in this pattern. Second, given a supply-demand pattern, we can choose another pattern with a smaller δ instead of choosing a pattern randomly. With these two approaches, we design an efficient pattern search (EPS) algorithm in this section. EPS is inspired by [12] , which considers a market with linear payoff functions. As payoff functions in this paper are concave and depend on the price vector p, computing a Walrasian Equilibrium is much more difficult. We construct a reverse flow network to model the supply and demand of sensing services and design an algorithm accordingly to increase the search speed.
In the rest of this section, we will first introduce preliminaries of some important concepts used in EPS. We then describe the algorithm and analyze the computational complexity of EPS.
A. Preliminaries
Given a price vector p, the set U j, p for each task initiator v j can be decided. We construct a weighted flow network N( p) based on U j, p . For any mobile user u i ∈ U and task initiator v j ∈ V , there is a directed edge e j i between them if u i ∈ U j . The capacity of each e j i , v j ∈ V , u i ∈ U j , is infinite. There is a source node s which connects with any task initiator v j ∈ V . The capacity of e s j is c s j = d j ( p). In addition, there is a destination node h which connects with any mobile user u i ∈ U, and the capacity of edge e ih is c ih = t i . Different from traditional flow network, there is a weight 
for any feasible weighted flow f of network N( p).
Another important concept used in EPS is tight set, which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Tight Set): Given a network N( p) and a balanced flow f , a subset U of U is a tight set if
B. Detailed Description
A detailed description of EPS is given in Algorithm 1, which is composed of initialization phase and operation phase. In initialization phase, EPS finds a feasible starting price vector. During operation phase, the prices are judiciously updated on the constructed weighted flow network N( p) to find the next supply-demand pattern with a smaller δ. A flow chart for Algorithm 1 is provided in Fig. 5 .
First, we focus on initialization, in which EPS finds an initial price vector p that satisfies the following two conditions: 1) Every mobile user is selected by at least one task initiator under the price vector, and 2) p i is large enough such that δ i ( p, f ) ≥ 0 holds for mobile user u i ∈ U under the balanced flow f . Such p can be obtained in the following way. First, findp i such that 
. Obviously, after the price adjustment, mobile user u i can be selected by at least one task initiator. Since p i <p i for some mobile user u i under the new price vector p,
After the initialization, EPS is divided into iterations, each of which consists of several steps. Given the price vector p, calculate the balanced flow f . Then find the maximum valuē δ of δ i , i.e.,δ = max u i ∈U δ i , and the set F of mobile users whose values of δ i achieve the maximum valueδ, i.e., F = {u i |u i ∈ U, δ i =δ}. In Algorithm 1, we have to compute x 1 and x 2 to determine which event will happen. We first discuss how to compute x 2 . As we reduce the prices of mobile users in F and maintain the prices of mobile users in U \ F , mobile users in F become more desirable for task initiator v j ∈ V \ F since p i w i j for task initiator v j ∈ V \ F becomes smaller. We need to find the maximum x 2 that triggers event 2. To this end, for any
We design an algorithm to find the maximum x 1 in Algorithm 2. Denote by N F ,F ( p) an induced subgraph of N( p), which consists of vertices {s} ∪ F ∪ F ∪ {h}. In the initialization, we set x 1 = 1 and x 1 = 0. By setting x 1 = (x 1 + x 1 )/2, we calculate the balanced flow for N F ,F (x 1 · p F ).
We update x 1 and x 1 according to the values of δ i obtained under the balanced flow. The algorithm terminates when we find x 1 under which there is a tight set.
Lastly, we show how to compute a balanced flow in the flow network N( p). Note that, given the capacities of edges, we can easily calculate the flow on edge e s j as
Then we can obtain the balanced flow if we can decide the Algorithm 2 Finding x 1 Initially, let x 1 = 1 and
flow division at each vertex v j . For this, we associate a division scheme α i j for each v i , with u i ∈V j, p α i j = 1. Therefore, give flow f s j on edge e s j , α i j f s j is going on edge e j i , u i ∈ V j, p . We can calculate the balanced flow by solving the following convex optimization problem:
Note that there may be multiple optimal solutions to problem (10) . We desire the optimal solution in which a task v j connected to a mobile user u i , satisfying δ i < δ i , would not have a link to a user u i . This can be obtained by starting with an arbitrary optimal solution and reducing the flow f j i until δ i = δ i or f j i = 0. In practice, ensure that the optimal solution to problem (10) can be obtained numerically by existing solvers. Otherwise, it would impact the convergence of the algorithm.
C. An illustrative Example
We now provide a simple example to illustrate how EPS works. We consider the case where there are four mobile users and four sensing tasks. The utility function of each task v j is given by a j log(1 + t). In this example, we set a 1 = 11.4834, a 2 = 11.5939, a 3 = 12.1208, a 4 = 12.5393, which are randomly generated. The budget vector b, weight matrix w and time budget t are also randomly selected. The initial prices of mobile users are set as (1.6284, 1.7937, 1.7354, 1.4800) .
The initial supply-demand pattern is depicted in Fig. 6(1) . At the first iteration, mobile user u 1 and u 3 are first included in set F since they have the largest remaining supply under current setting. Then p 1 and p 3 are reduced by 0.9165, (i.e., p 1 = 1.4925, p 3 = 1.5905), such that edge e 23 is added. After calculating the balanced flow under the updated prices, mobile users u 2 is added to F since δ 2 > δ 3 . Similarly, edge e 12 is added as the prices of p 1 , p 2 and p 3 are decreased, and mobile users u 4 is included in F . At the end of the first iteration, the prices are updated to (0.3078, 0.3699, 0.3280, 0.3118). The value of δ 2 is reduced to 0 under such prices, which terminates the first iteration (see Fig. 6(3) ). At the second iteration, mobile user u 1 is included in F after the recalculation of balanced flow as he has the largest δ 1 . Edge e 33 is deleted since v 3 is connected to u 1 in F (note that there is no flow on edge e 33 ). When p 1 is decreased to 0.2977, edge e 21 is added. After calculating the balanced flow, 
D. Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the theoretical performance of the EPS algorithm. Before presenting the main results, we give Lemma 3 as follows.
Lemma 3: In EPS, each step in any iteration captures a supply-demand pattern. Moreover, each iteration in EPS has at most m steps.
Proof: In EPS, given an initial price vector p, a flow network is constructed based on the supply-demand pattern. During iterations, given a flow network N( p) and a balanced flow f , the set F of mobile users with maximumδ is calculated. We reduce the prices of mobile users in F proportionally. The set U j, p does not change for each task initiator v j ∈ F . Therefore, the supply-demand pattern between task initiators F and mobile users F remains while the prices of mobile users in F are decreased. Moreover, in each iteration at least one task initiator is added into F at each step. As the number of task initiators is m, each iteration has at most m steps. Now, we present the main result about the performance of EPS.
Theorem 4: EPS can find an -approximation algorithm in polynomial time.
Proof:
The main idea of the proof is based on [12] . We first show that in each iteration there is at least one mobile user u i whose δ i is reduced byδ m . Let δ (k) and δ (k) i denote the value of δ and δ i at step k, respectively. Assume there are m steps in the iteration. Let δ (k) = min
be the minimum δ i of mobile users in F at step k. At the beginning of the iteration, δ (0) =δ, while at the last step, δ (m ) = 0 (since a subset S is a strictly tight set). Therefore, there is a step k such that
Since all the mobile users added to F have larger δ i than those that are already in the set F . Hence, δ (k) and δ (k−1) are found on the same set of mobile users. Let u i be the mobile user who has the minimum δ i in step k − 1. Clearly, δ
With this result, in a similar way as [12] , we can show that an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate our analysis and demonstrate the properties of Walrasian Eqiulibrium.
In the simulations, system parameters are given in the following way when there is no explicit specification. Each task initiator is associated with a utility function φ j (t) = a j log (1 + t) . We set the budget of each task initiator as a random number in [2, 7] , and coefficient a j as a random number in [10, 15] . We also set the available time t i of each mobile user as a random number in [10, 17] . We consider there are n = 8 mobile users and m = 8 sensing tasks.
In the first scenario, we randomly select system parameters as introduced in the previous paragraph. The Walrasian Equilibrium is calculated by EPS. The prices of mobile users in the Walrasian Equilibirum are obtained as p = (0.2960, 0.3328, 0.2917, 0.2964, 0.2911, 0.2947, 0.2744, 0.3135). We show the values of δ during the execution of EPS in Fig. 7 . It is obvious that EPS converges very quickly to the Walrasian Equilibrium within 15 steps. The payoffs that both mobile users and task owners gain are provided in Table II . We obverse that the payoffs of mobile users are highly dependent on their available time budget t i , which decides the supply in the market. Further, the utility functions of sensing tasks have a great impact on the payoffs of task owners.
To further understand the impact of supply in the market on the payoffs of both mobile users and task owners, in the second scenario we set the time budget t i of each mobile user u i 50% of that in the scenario 1 while fixing other parameters. The convergence of EPS and the Walrasian Equilibrium are plotted in Fig. 8 , and Table III . It can be seen that the price of each mobile user is nearly as twice as that in the previous case. As a result, the payoffs of mobile users do not change much. However, task owners gain lower payoffs since the prices for sensing service increase due to short market supply.
We proceed to investigate the impact of the utility function on the payoffs of both mobile users and task owners in the third scenario. To this end, we adopt the same simulation setting as in the first scenario, with one modification that a j in the utility function is reduced by 50%. The results are plotted in Fig. 9 , and Table IV. We can see that the convergence rate is still fast. Further, all task owners have much less payoff than those obtained in the scenario 1, while payoffs of mobile users do not decrease much.
We also plot in Fig. 10 the ratio of each individual (mobile users or task owners) payoff to the achieved social welfare. We can see that mobile users and task owners in Scenario 1 and 3 have similar share even though they have very different payoffs in these two scenarios. This is mainly because the supplies of sensing services are the same in two scenarios. For the same reason, mobile users in scenario 2 have large share since the supply is halved. Therefore, we conclude that, by the introduced Walrasian Equilibrium, the time budget of each mobile users and the utility function of each task owner greatly impact their payoffs while the supply-demand relation decides the share of each individual in the social welfare. It is easy to see that the payoffs of both mobile users and task owners are relied on the supply-demand relation in the market. No parties can dominate the process to maximize unilateral payoff.
VII. RELATED WORK There has been a surge of interest in system design for mobile crowdsensing applications [2] , [14] , [17] - [23] due to the rapid advance in mobile networks [24] - [29] . Incentive mechanism design is one of the hot and fundamental problem in crowdsensing, which aims to provide fair and efficient mechanism to encourage the participation of crowd [6] , [7] , [9] . Exploiting the fact that vehicles can be embedded multiple sensors and have the distinct advantage of predictable mobility, He et al. [30] proposed a mechanism to maximize the spatio-temporal coverage based on the predicted trajectory in the scenario where the users in crowdsoucring are vehicles. Zhang et al. [31] designed incentive mechanisms based on auction theory, single-requester single-bid, single-requester multiple-bid and multiple-requester multiple-bid, according to the number of requesters and the number of bids that a user can use. It is shown that individual rational, budget balance, computational efficiency and truthfulness can be satisfied in this mechanism. Luo et al. [8] adopt an all-pay auction based approach to maximize the utility of the platform, focusing on the scenario where users are risk-averse and the number of users participating is stochastic. Similarly, Sun and Tham [32] introduced a novel metric called information utility metric for the data quality. They devised an incentive mechanism where the quality of crowdsourced data is guaranteed. Luo et al. [33] considered the scenario where a user's behavior can affect the utility of others, which is called nepotism. As users' behavior could affect the utility of their friends, users is motivated to participate in tasks and behave honestly. An incentive mechanism based on such principle was designed. Duan et al. [34] employed the contract theory to design pricing mechanisms for data collection and distributed computing. They also designed an efficient incentive mechanism for dynamic routing in social information sharing [35] . Cao et al. [36] introduced a user selection mechanism to consider the impact of long-term crowdsourcing. Since transmission is quite important for data sensing [37] , Xiao et al. [38] proposed an energy-efficient data transmission protocol for mobile crowd sensing, which increases the delivery ratio and reduces the overhead ratio simultaneously.
The existence and properties of a Walrasian Equilibrium have been extensively studied in economics [39] . Meanwhile, researchers in computer science have recently started to investigate how to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium with low computational complexity. Devanur et al. [12] designed a polynomial-time algorithm to obtain an exact Walrasian Equilibrium for a fisher market with linear payoff functions. Codenotti and Varadarajan [40] designed an algorithm to find an exact Walrasian Equilibrium in polynomial time for Fisher market with Leontief payoff functions. It is shown in [10] and [16] that computing an exact Walrasian Equilibrium for fisher market with general payoff functions (even piecewise linear functions) is PPAD complete. More recent work can be found in [11] and [41] and the references therein.
In this work, we design a comprehensive incentive scheme, by taking into account the interest of all parties. This approach is radically different from existing researches in crowdsensing, which focus only on the interest of one party. Moreover, the payoff functions in our problem are in general concave, and depends on the price vector. These unique characteristics make it more challenging to compute a Walrasian Equilibrium.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the joint pricing and allocation to incentivize mobile users to participate in mobile crowdsensing. We studied this problem from an exchange market perspective with the goal of achieving a Walrasian Equilibrium. We first characterized the supply-demand pattern for a fixed price vector, which reveals an important structure of the problem. We then devised methods that can determine the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium within each supply-demand pattern. We showed that these methods can find an exact Walrasian Equilibrium in polynomial time for the case when the classes of mobile devices (but not the number of mobile devices) are bounded. Since it requires exponential time complexity for the general case, we therefore designed an efficient pattern search (EPS) algorithm to speed up the pattern searching process, and proved that this EPS algorithm can find an -approximation Walrasian Equilibrium within polynomial time. We also performed simulations to validate our analysis. 
